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AGENCY KNOWS BEST? RESTRICTING
JUDGES' ABILITY TO PLACE CHILDREN
IN ALTERNATIVE PLANNED
PERMANENT LIVING ARRANGEMENTS
INTRODUCTION
Since the enactment of the Adoption and Safe Families Act1
(ASFA) of 1997, permanency for children in foster care has been a
major goal of each state's child welfare system.2 The focus on
permanency was meant to combat "foster care drift," the phenomenon
of children languishing in multiple foster care placements without a
permanent goal or any plan for their futures.3 ASFA sets forth several
permanency goals: reunification with parent(s), termination of
parental rights and placement for adoption, legal guardianship,
placement with a relative, or "another planned permanent living
arrangement."4 These placement options are listed in descending
order of preference; reunification with the parents, when possible, is
the preferred option, and "another planned permanent living
arrangement" is the least favored option.
Ohio calls these disfavored alternative placements "planned
permanent living arrangements" (PPLAs)5-rather a misnomer, as all
permanency options for children are (or should be) living
arrangements that are planned and permanent. PPLAs can take many
forms-long-term family foster care, placement in a group foster
I Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C.).
2 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES,
PROGRAM INSTRUCTION ACYF-CB-PI-98-02 (1998), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cb/laws_policies/policy/pi/pi9802.htm (stating that the purposes of ASFA are to
ensure children's "safety, permanency, and well-being").
3 See, e.g., Richard P. Barth, Fred Wulczyn & Tom Crea, From Anticipation to Evidence:
Research on the Adoption and Safe Families Act, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 371, 373 (2005).
4 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2000).
5 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.01 1(B)(37) (West Supp. 2007).
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home,6 or placement in an institution such as a hospital or mental
health facility. Under the Ohio Revised Code, a PPLA is an order of a
juvenile court pursuant to which both of the following apply:
(a) The court gives legal custody of a child to a public
children services agency or a private child placing agency
without the termination of parental rights. (b) The order
permits the agency to make an appropriate placement of the
child and to enter into a written agreement with a foster care
provider or with another person or agency with whom the
child is placed.
All PPLA placements are made "with the intention that the child
will remain in that home or institution until he is no longer in the
county child services system. A PPLA does not sever the parental
bonds as permanent custody does, but it also does not provide the
child with a legally permanent placement" as, for instance, adoption
would.8
Children are placed in PPLAs only when the other, more preferred,
permanency goals are inappropriate. Because PPLA placements are
disfavored, each state's laws typically require various findings before
a judge can make a PPLA placement. Ohio Revised Code § 2151.353,
relating to dispositional options in child protection proceedings,
provides, in relevant part:
(A) If a child is adjudicated an abused, neglected, or
dependent child, the court may make any of the following
orders of disposition: ...
(5) Place the child in a planned permanent living
arrangement with a public children services agency
or private child placing agency, if a public children
services agency or private child placing agency
requests the court to place the child in a planned
permanent living arrangement and if the court finds,
by clear and convincing evidence, that a planned
permanent living arrangement is in the best interest
of the child and that one of the following exists:
6 Family foster care refers to placements in which a foster family cares for a child in a
private home. Group foster homes, on the other hand, are just that-group homes for foster
children, without a family-like setting.
7 § 2151.011(B)(37).
8 In re D.B.,No. 81421, 2003 WL 21511310, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. July 3, 2003).
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(a) The child, because of physical, mental, or
psychological problems or needs, is unable to
function in a family-like setting and must remain in
residential or institutional care.
(b) The parents of the child have significant physical,
mental, or psychological problems and are unable to
care for the child because of those problems,
adoption is not in the best interest of the child...
and the child retains a significant and positive
relationship with a parent or relative.
(c) The child is sixteen years of age or older, has
been counseled on the permanent placement options
available to the child, is unwilling to accept or unable
to adapt to a permanent placement, and is in an
agency program preparing the child for independent
living.
For most children, long-term state custody is a poor option with
poor outcomes. Adoption can provide a brighter future for many
foster children, but it is not a one-size-fits-all solution. For a few
children, a PPLA is the only appropriate permanency option.
A recent Ohio Supreme Court decision, In re A.B.,9 categorically
prohibits judges from placing children in PPLAs unless the state child
welfare agency has first requested such a placement. As a matter of
statutory interpretation, the decision is questionable. As a matter of
policy, it is potentially disastrous.
This Note is the story of four siblings whose individual best
interests the Ohio Supreme Court failed to consider in face of a
general public policy favoring termination of parental rights and
adoption. Part I of this Note tells these children's story. Part II
examines the myriad ways in which the Ohio Supreme Court decision
failed these children and other children in similar circumstances. Part
III examines the PPLA statutes in Ohio and other states, and Part IV
suggests judicial and legislative changes that would permit
individualized consideration of a child's best interests.
I. A STORY OF FOUR SIBLINGS
In May 2003, the Summit County Children Services Board placed
four siblings in foster care after allegations that their parents were not
9 852 N.E.2d 1187 (Ohio 2006).
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providing for their basic needs and were abusing drugs. Eventually,
the mother voluntarily surrendered her parental rights. The father
enrolled in two drug treatment programs, but relapsed after each
program. At the time of the termination trial, he was enrolled in a
nine-month inpatient drug treatment program.10
In June 2004, the trial court appointed an attorney to represent the
children's wishes after being notified that the children's desire to
return to their father conflicted with the guardian ad litem's (GAL's)
determination of their best interests. In October 2004, the agency filed
a motion for permanent custody of the children. The children's
attorney moved instead for a PPLA-a long-term foster care
placement with the children's current foster mother.1 '
At the termination of parental rights trial in March 2005, it was
undisputed that the four children (who ranged in age from 6 to 12
years old at the time) were closely bonded and it was in their best
interests to remain together as a sibling group. The agency
caseworker testified that it would be detrimental to the children to
separate them. The caseworker further testified that no adoptive
family had been identified for the children, that the agency could not
guarantee the children would remain together if they were placed for
adoption, and that she had never encountered a family who adopted a
sibling group of four. The children's current foster mother-by whom
the GAL was "amazed"-was willing to continue caring for the
children indefinitely. The foster mother did not want to adopt,
however, because she was in her late 50s and did not want to
"burden" her own adult children with raising the B. siblings if
something should happen to her. The GAL testified that it was in the
children's best interests to continue placement with the current foster
mother. 12 After a full hearing on the agency's motion, the trial court
found that terminating the father's rights was not in the children's
best interests, and instead granted the motion for a PPLA placement
with the children's current foster mother.'
3
The Ohio Supreme Court ruled, five to two, that the plain
language of section 2151.353(A)(5) was "unambiguous" and
prohibited a juvenile court judge from placing a child in a PPLA
unless the agency had first requested a PPLA placement. 14 In so
doing, the Court ignored the dissent's forceful argument that the
10 In re A.B., No. 22659, 2005 WL 2291869, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2005), cert.
granted, 840 N.E.2d 201 (Ohio 2005), rev'd, 852 N.E.2d 1187 (Ohio 2006).
1 Id.
12 Id. at *3-4.
13 Id. at *1.
14 In re A.B., 852 N.E.2d at 1193.
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statute cited applied only to initial dispositions immediately following
a finding that the child is abused, neglected, or dependent, and that
the PPLA ordered for the B. siblings was a final disposition."5 The
majority opinion reasoned that section 2151.353 places restrictions on
PPLAs because "[a] planned permanent living arrangement places a
child in limbo, which can delay placement in a permanent home."'
16
Presumably, the court meant that PPLA placements would delay
children's placements into legally permanent (i.e., adoptive) homes;
any home can be permanent in duration.
II. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF A.B.
Although the precise number of Ohio foster children in
circumstances similar to the B. siblings is unclear, the Ohio Supreme
Court decision in A.B. affects far more than the four siblings whose
fates were at issue. Nationwide, there were approximately 513,000
children in foster care in fiscal year 2005.17 Seven percent of those
children-37,628-had a case plan goal of long-term foster care.'
8
Another six percent-31,938-had a goal of emancipation, 19 meaning
that their goal was to remain in foster care until reaching majority. A
further eight percent--42,403-had no case plan goal yet,20 and it is
possible that some of this group could eventually have goals of long-
term foster care or emancipation. Assuming that the percentage of
children with these goals who reside in Ohio is equal to Ohio's
proportion of the U.S. population (3.8 percene), an estimated 2,643
Ohio foster children have case plan goals of long-term foster care or
22
emancipation. 2 The B. siblings are not alone.
The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in A.B. has potentially
devastating ramifications not only for the B. siblings and foster
children in similar circumstances, but for all Ohio foster children. The
15 For more on the dissenting opinion and a discussion of the statutory interpretation
arguments for and against the Ohio Supreme Court's decision, see infra Part II.A.
16 In re A.B., 852 N.E.2d at 1193.
17 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, THE
AFCARS REP.-PRELIMINARY FY 2005 ESTIMATES AS OF SEPEMBER 2006, available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats research/afcars/tar/report 13.htm (last visited July 18,
2007).
IS Id.
19 Id
20 Id.
21 Ohio Department of Development, Ohio's Population, www.odod.state.oh.us/
research/files/p0006.pdf (last visited March 15, 2007).
22 Of course, this estimate is just that-an estimate, and it may not be accurate. However,
unless the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services publicizes the statistics for each case
plan goal, this seems to be the only way to get a sense of the number of children that the Ohio
Supreme Court's decision might affect.
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decision contradicts the legislative purposes behind the federal
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, equates permanency with
termination of parental rights, blindly asserts that adoption is always
achievable and always in a child's best interests despite the very real
problem of "legal orphans," and assumes that the agency should be
the primary--or even sole-arbiter of a child's best interests.
A. The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA)23 has been
described as "the most significant change in federal child welfare and
child protection policy in nearly 20 years., 24 Upon signing the
legislation, President Clinton said that it "fundamentally alter[ed] our
Nation's approach to foster care and adoption.,'2 5 The overarching
purposes of ASFA, according to the federal Administration for
Children and Families, are "safety, permanency, and well-being" for
children.26
ASFA's changes to child welfare law include: "clarify[ing] the
'reasonable efforts' requirement, expedit[ing] the process of placing
children with permanent families when they cannot return home,
emphasiz[ing] child safety and promot[ing] adoption when
appropriate for the child., 27 Among ASFA's requirements are a series
of timeframes that must be met in order for states to continue
receiving federal funds. Permanency hearings-hearings at which a
child's permanent plan is decided- must be held within 12 months of
a child's entry into foster care. 28 The state is required to file for
termination of parental rights when a child has been in foster care for
fifteen of the past twenty-two months, when a child is an abandoned
infant (as state law determines), or when the parent has killed another
child or perpetrated "serious bodily injury" on the child or another
23 Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C.).
24 Richard J. Gelles, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 Rightly Places Child
Safety First, BROWN U. CHILD & ADOLESCENT BEHAVIOR LETrER, April 1998, 1, at 1.
25 Remarks on Signing the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 33 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. DOC. 1863, 1864 (Nov. 19, 1997) [hereinafter Remarks].
26 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES,
PROGRAM INSTRUCTION ACYF-CB-PI-98-02 (1998), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cb/lawspolicies/policy/pi/pi9802.htm; see also Remarks, supra note 25, at 1864
("[ASFA] will improve the well-being of hundreds of thousands of our most vulnerable
children. The new legislation makes it clear that children's health and safety are the paramount
concerns of our public child welfare system. It makes it clear that good foster care provides
important safe havens for our children, but it is by definition a temporary, not a permanent,
setting.").
27 Steve Christian, 1998 State Legislative Responses to the Adoption and Safe Families
Act of 1997, State Legislative Report (March 1999), available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/
cyf/asfaslr.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2006).
- 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2000).
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child.29 The fifteen-of-twenty-two-months timeframe, as researcher
Fred Wulczyn notes, "has no developmental referent-it applies
whether the child is fifteen days or fifteen years old at the time of
entrance into foster care.",30 Four states, including Ohio, have
shortened the timeframe to require filings for termination of parental
rights when the child has spent twelve of the past twenty-two months
in foster care.3' Other states, most notably Minnesota and Colorado,
have shortened the timeframe for permanency hearings when the
child is below a certain age.32
Under ASFA, the state is not required to file for termination of
parental rights within this timeframe if a relative is caring for the
child, if the agency has documented "a compelling reason" why filing
is not in the child's best interests, or if the state has not provided
services necessary to reunify the child with his or her family. 33 One
compelling reason not to file for termination of parental rights,
according to federal regulations, is that adoption is not an appropriate
goal for the child.34 No states statutorily defined these "compelling
reasons," but two states-Iowa and West Virginia--did provide
examples.35 Iowa includes as a compelling reason a "reasonable
likelihood that completion of services will make it possible for the
child to safely remain home or return home within six months. 36
West Virginia includes as compelling reasons "the child's age and
preference regarding termination of parental rights and that the child
is in placement as a juvenile delinquent." 37 California, Iowa, and
Rhode Island enacted a handful of other exceptions to the fifteen-of-
twenty-two requirement that also could be considered "compelling
reasons," although the statutes do not call the exceptions by that
language.38
29 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E).
30 FRED WULCZYN ET AL., BEYOND COMMON SENSE: CHILD WELFARE, CHILD WELL-
BEING, AND THE EVIDENCE FOR POLICY REFORM 9 (2005).
31 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.413 (West 2006). The other states that have adopted the
twelve-of-twenty-two requirement are Florida, Michigan, and Rhode Island. Christian, supra
note 27.
32 COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-102(1.6) (2006) ("[The general assembly finds and declares
that it is appropriate to provide for an expedited placement procedure to ensure that children
under the age of six years who have been removed from their homes are placed in permanent
homes as expeditiously as possible."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-702 (requiring permanency
hearing within three months of the dispositional hearing for children under 6 years old); MINN.
STAT. § 260C.301(5)(i) (2006) (six months for children under 8 years old).
33 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E).
- 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(i)(2)(ii)(A) (2006).
35 Christian, supra note 27.
36 Id. (citing IOWA CODE § 232.111).
37 Id. (citing W.vA. CODE § 49-6-5b).
38 See id.
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Even though ASFA places the burden on the agency to document
an exception to the fifteen-of-twenty-two requirement, it is possible
that the "compelling reason" not to file for termination of parental
rights could arise due to judicial action-for example, if there were a
permanency hearing at which the judge denied the agency's motion to
change the child's case plan permanency goal to termination of
parental rights. The judge's denial of the motion to change the
permanency goal then would be a compelling reason for the agency
not to proceed with filing a subsequent motion to terminate parental
rights. Additionally, one could argue that the agency has documented
compelling reasons if the agency's own evidence at the permanency
hearing proved to the judge that there was a good reason not to
proceed towards termination.
Of course, this presumes that there is formal review of a child's
case plan goal before the agency files a petition to terminate parental
rights, and that is not necessarily the case in Ohio. For instance,
Cuyahoga County--Ohio's most populous-tends to skip a separate
permanency hearing and address the issue of permanency at the
annual review hearing; the court has very little input in the
permanency plan.39 This appears to meet ASFA's timelines, but
perhaps not its spirit; ASFA seems to envision a separate permanency
hearing at which the court, not the agency, would decide which
permanency goal was appropriate for the child, and when to
implement the goal.4 ° If Ohio judges typically do not have any review
of agency decisions regarding the permanency plan until the
termination of parental rights trial, judicial action is probably unlikely
to create a "compelling reason" for the agency not to file a petition to
terminate parental rights.
Although ASFA requires the agency to file for termination of
parental rights once a child spends fifteen of twenty-two months in
foster care, ASFA does not-and cannot-mandate that the court
grant a motion for termination of parental rights. If parents' rights
were automatically terminated after children spent fifteen-of-twenty-
39 Interview with Lynne L. Stewart, Staff Attorney, Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court, in
Cleveland, Ohio (Jan. 3, 2007).
40 See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) ("[States must] assure each child in foster care . . . a
permanency hearing to be held... no later than 12 months after the date the child is considered
to have entered foster care... , which hearing shall determine the permanency plan for the
child that includes whether, and if applicable when, the child will be returned to the parent,
placed for adoption and the State will file a petition for termination of parental rights, or referred
for legal guardianship, or (in cases where-the State agency has documented to the State court a
compelling reason for determining that it would not be in the best interests of the child to return
home, be referred for termination of parental rights, or be placed for adoption, with a fit and
willing relative, or with a legal guardian) placed in another planned permanent living
arrangement....") (emphasis added).
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two months in care, without judicial discretion to deny a termination
petition, this would be an incredible due process concern; family
bonds are a fundamental right.
4
'
This required judicial discretion presents a problem directly
relevant to the issue of PPLA placements. Suppose the agency files a
petition to terminate parental rights, and the statutory grounds for
termination are met (whether the grounds are the length of time a
child has been in care or another enumerated reason), but it is not in
the child's best interests to terminate parental rights. Perhaps the child
would benefit from continuing a relationship with his or her parent(s),
perhaps the child has a significant relationship with another biological
relative, or perhaps some other reason makes termination
inappropriate. Due process requires the judge to have discretion to
deny the agency's motion to terminate parental rights, as noted above.
But what happens when the judge finds that terminating the parents'
rights is not in the child's best interests and denies the agency's
motion for termination? If a judge does not have discretion to place
the child in an alternative permanent placement instead of terminating
parental rights (because the agency did not request placement in a
PPLA), the child will remain in foster care, but without a permanent
plan. This contravenes the very purpose of ASFA, to provide
permanency and prevent foster care drift. Yet the Ohio Supreme
Court decision appears to sanction precisely this result.
Under the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation of the statutes, a
judge appears to have discretion to deny the agency's motion for
termination of parental rights and order any other permanency option
except a PPLA placement. For instance, in A.B., the judge apparently
could have ordered a guardianship with the children's current foster
mother without running afoul of the Ohio Revised Code. However, by
transitioning from being a foster parent to being a guardian, the foster
mother would lose the financial subsidies that assist her in caring for
the four children; depending on a foster parent's financial situation,
this loss of support could be enough to decide against guardianship.42
41 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) ("The fundamental liberty interest of
natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply
because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the
State.").
42 Ohio has no subsidized guardianship program, although some other states do. Center
for Law and Social Policy and Children's Defense Fund, Child Welfare in Ohio (2006),
http://www.clasp.org/publications/childwelfare-in ohio06.pdf. In many of the states that have
established subsidized guardianships, subsidies are available only to relative caregivers; in
others, the children must be above a certain age to qualify. Children's Defense Fund, States'
Subsidized Guardianship Laws at a Glance (October 2004), http://www.childrensdefense.org/
site/DocServer/guardianshiplaws.pdf?doclD=544.
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Guardianship probably was not a feasible option for the foster mother
in A.B., or one of the parties would have suggested it. Yet the judge
could have ordered this non-ideal placement sua sponte, but could not
order what appeared to be the most appropriate placement.
B. Rates ofAdoption
Despite ASFA's encouragement of termination of parental rights
and adoption, older children remain statistically far less likely to leave
the foster care system through adoption than younger children;
adoption may not be a realistic possibility for some of these children.
The rate of adoption is highest for children who are placed into foster
care as infants; infants are nearly as likely to be adopted as they are to
be reunited with their biological families.43 The rate of adoption
decreases markedly for children placed into care as one-year-olds,
and steadily declines based on age.an
Children who are six to ten years old at the time of their first
placement into foster care are the age group most likely to remain in
care after six years have passed.45 At eight years old, although more
than sixty percent of children who enter foster care at that age are
reunited with their parent(s), they are slightly more likely to leave
through "other" exits than be adopted.46 "Other" exits include running
away, emancipation, and transfers to other systems (most notably the
juvenile justice system).47 The rate of "other" exits increases
markedly after eight years old and far outstrips adoptions for older
children.48 For children who enter foster care at fifteen years old,
"other" exits from foster care comprise one-third of all exits. 49
Researcher Fred Wulczyn observes: "Although children above age 10
at the time of entry are about as likely to go home as other, younger
children are, the likelihood of adoption is below 10 percent and
quickly approaches zero. Among children who entered foster care at
age 14 or above, an exit by way of completed adoption was rare. 5°
Indeed, federal statistics show that of all adoptions finalized
nationwide in fiscal year 2004, the vast majority were children under
ten years old at the time of finalization. 51 The percentages range from
43 WULCZYN ET AL., supra note 30, at 111 (chart).
4Id.
45 Id. at 173.
46 Id. at 11 1 (chart).
47 Id. at 111.
48 Id. at 111 (chart).
49 WULCZYN ET AL., supra note 30, at 117 n.7.
so Id. at 176 (emphasis in original).
3 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES,
CHILD'S FINALIZATION AGE (GROUPED), OCT. 1, 2003 TO SEPT. 30, 2004 (2006),
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sixty-three percent in the District of Columbia to eight-nine percent in
the state of Washington.52 Given the time that usually elapses before
an adoption is finalized, these adopted children entered foster care at
even younger ages.
The mean wait between termination of parental rights and adoption
finalization, according to the same federal statistics, was more than a
year, everywhere except the District of Columbia, Indiana, Iowa,
Missouri, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Utah, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. 3 These jurisdictions also had extremely low median
waits-as low as 2.02 months in Rhode Island. 4 Maine had the
longest mean wait between termination and adoption finalization, at
22.84 months; the median wait there was 17.48 months.55 In Ohio, the
mean wait was 19.90 months and the median wait was 13.27
months; 56 the disparity in the two numbers indicates that a significant
number of the more than 2200 Ohio adoptees 57 waited far longer than
the mean between termination and adoption. Of course, these figures
do not consider the amount of time that elapses between placement
into "the system" and termination of parental rights, which also may
be lengthy.
C. "Legal Orphans"
These statistics indicate that adoption may not be a realistic,
achievable permanency plan for many older children. The vast
majority of adoptions occur before a child's eleventh birthday, and
these adopted children entered the system far earlier, and younger.
Thus, if the rights of older children's parents are terminated without
an adoptive resource in place, the termination is far less likely to lead
to a completed adoption than for younger children. This could leave
older children as "legal orphans"-children who have no legal ties to
anyone but the state.58 The number of legal orphans appears to have
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/statsresearch/afcars/statistics/age06.htn.
52 Id.
53 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES,
TIME BETWEEN TPR AND FINALIZATION, OCT. 1, 2002 TO SEPT. 30, 2003 (2006),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/statsresearch/afcars/statistics/time06.htm. The means are:
D.C. (7.97 months), Indiana (11.48 months), Iowa (11.66 months), Missouri (9.46 months),
Puerto Rico (9.30 months), Rhode Island (6.83 months), Utah (8.22 months), Wisconsin (7.50
months), and Wyoming (8.01 months).
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. The wait figures in the federal statistics do not include 177 Ohio adoptees for whom
data were unavailable.
58 "When TPRs [terminations of parental rights] are followed by adoption into a lifetime
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risen significantly since 1997; within three years after ASFA's
passage, research suggested that the number of terminations of
parental rights was increasing significantly.59 Subsequent studies
found that forty-two percent of children in North Carolina, and forty-
seven percent of children in Colorado whose parents' rights had been
terminated remained in foster care at the conclusion of the study. 60 In
Ohio, a total of 6,664 children whose parents' rights had been
terminated were in the permanent custody of public children services
agencies at the end of fiscal year 2005.61
ASFA's accelerated timelines for termination of parental rights
were motivated, in part, by a reasoning "that children are much more
likely to be adopted if they are free of legal attachments to their
caregivers and can be identified by adoptive families as available for
adoption,"62 but a recent survey of the research found "negligible
evidentiary support" for this proposition with regard to older
children.63 The experience of at least one large county, in fact,
suggests that it is possible to increase the number of adoptions
without creating legal orphans-by aggressively seeking adoptive
parents before the biological parents' rights are terminated-thus
reducing the amount of time children spend in legal limbo. Allegheny
County, Pennsylvania (in which Pittsburgh is located), has 0.4 percent
of the nation's population but completes twice that percentage-0.8
percent-of the nation's foster care adoptions. 64 The county managed
family, it contributes to the goal of having children move into legally permanent homes. But if it
fails, it may result in children who have no legal relationship to any parents or guardians." Barth
et al., supra note 3, at 395.
59 See Stephanie J. Gendell, In Search of Permanency: A Reflection on the First Three
Years of the Adoption and Safe Families Act Implementation, 39 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS.
REv. 25, 32-33 (2001). (discussing national trends since ASFA's passage).
60 Barth et al., supra note 3, at 390 (citing DEBORAH GIBBS ET AL., RTI INTERNATIONAL,
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS FOR OLDER FOSTER CHILDREN: EXPLORING PRACTICE
AND POLICY ISSUES ES-2, 3-14, 4-19 (2004)).
61 THE OHIO DEP'T OF JOB & FAMILY SERV., 2005 ANN. REP. at 18, http://jfs.ohio.gov/
ocomm root/2005AnnualReport.pdf (last visited March 15, 2007).
62 Barth et al., supra note 3, at 389. Indeed, certain federal policies encourage states to
pursue termination of parental rights, even for older children, long before potential adoptive
families have been identified, in the belief that early terminations will facilitate eventual
adoptions. See ADMIN. OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, CHILD WELFARE OUTCOMES: 2001 ANN.
REP. TO CONGRESS, EXECUTWE SUMMARY, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/eb/
pubs/cwoOl/chapters/executive.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2007) ("The analyses of CFSR Final
Report information identified the following potential barriers to attaining permanency for older
children: ... A perception of agency and court personnel that older children are 'unadoptable'
and that filing for termination of parental rights will only result in the creation of 'legal
orphans.'").
63 Barth et al., supra note 3, at 397.
64 Barbara White Stack, County a Model on Foster Adoption: Agency Meets U.S. Goals
Without Raising Number of Legal Orphans, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 26, 2004, at
[Vol. 58:1
AGENCY RESTRICTS CHILD PLACEMENT
both to increase reunification services and aggressively pursue
adoption when reunification was infeasible, reducing the average time
children spend in foster care to just twenty-two months, nearly a year
less than the nationwide average.65 Allegheny County refused to
create a large class of legal orphans in its quest to increase adoptions;
at the end of 2004, the county had precisely seven legal orphans.66 Its
experience indicates that achieving permanency for foster children is
possible without turning the children into long-term legal orphans.
Less than two months before its decision in A.B., the Supreme
Court of Ohio decided In re McBride,67 a case involving a legal
orphan. In that case, a mother whose rights had been terminated filed
a non-relative petition for custody of her biological daughter; the girl
had been in foster care since 1996 but had never been adopted. 68 The
court unanimously held that the biological mother had no standing to
petition for custody of the daughter to whom her rights were
terminated.69 Strangely, the court mentioned very little about the child
involved, except a brief mention in one of the final sentences of the
opinion: "We recognize that Selina's current situation is not ideal...
,,70
In both McBride and A.B., the court had the opportunity to address
the problem of Ohio's 6,664 legal orphans,71 but it did not even
discuss the issue. The trial court in A.B. appeared to choose a PPLA
placement, in part, because it wanted to avoid making the children
legal orphans. The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in A.B. indicates
that this is not an acceptable motivation for a judicial decision, yet
this motivation appears to directly relate to a child's best interests.
Indeed, for many children, it may be detrimental to sever biological
family ties without any realistic possibility of adoption.
D. Biological Family Ties and "Aging Out"
Ties to a biological family can become especially important as a
child ages. Children who "age out" of foster care without a permanent
family are far more at risk for "a range of deleterious outcomes as a
Al 8.
65 Id.
6 Id.
67 850 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 2006).
68 Id. at 44.
69 Id. at 47.
70 Id.
71 THE OHIO DEP'T OF JOB & FAMILY SERV., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT: ACCOMPLISHMENTS
18 (2005) (recounting the department's accomplishments from July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2005).
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young adult such as early pregnancy or parenthood, criminal
involvement, homelessness, lack of employment or dropping out of
high school. '7 2 One study found that twenty-seven percent of young
men and ten percent of young women reported that they had been in
jail at least once in the first twelve to eighteen months after leaving
the Wisconsin child welfare system.73 Thirteen percent of the young
women reported being sexually assaulted or raped during that time.
74
Nearly half (forty-four percent) reported that obtaining medical care
was a problem most or all of the time since leaving the child welfare
system, and thirty-two percent said the same of "having enough
money."75 Only sixty-one percent of the youths were employed when
interviewed twelve to eighteen months after their discharge from
foster care, and only nine percent had entered college.76 Twelve
percent of the Wisconsin former foster youth reported being homeless
at least once, and twenty-two percent had lived in at least four places
in the twelve to eighteen months following their discharge.77
According to a recent Michigan study, forty-seven percent of former
72 LAUREN L. FREY ET AL., CASEY FAMILY SERVICES, A CALL TO ACTION: AN
INTEGRATED APPROACH TO YOUTH PERMANENCY AND PREPARATION FOR ADULTHOOD I (Apr.
2005). See also LUCY A. BILAVER & MARK E. COURTNEY, NAT'L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT
TEEN PREGNANCY, CHAPIN HALL CENTER FOR CHILDREN, SCIENCE SAYS: FOSTER CARE
YOUTH 1 (Aug. 2006) (finding that "at age 19, foster youth who leave the system are at higher
risk for teen pregnancy and birth than both their peers who remain in the system and youth who
have never been in foster care."); ROBERT M. GOERGE ET AL., CHAPIN HALL CENTER FOR
CHILDREN, EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES FOR YOUTH AGING OUT OF FOSTER CARE (MAR. 2002)
(finding that former foster care youth are underemployed, earn less than their peers, and make
slower progress in the job market); MARTHA SHIRK & GARY STANGLER, ON THEIR OWN:
WHAT HAPPENS TO KIDS WHEN THEY AGE OUT OF THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM (2004) (tracing
the fates of several former foster children); Mary Elizabeth Collins, Transition to Adulthood for
Vulnerable Youths: A Review of Research and Implications for Policy, 75 SOC. SERVICE REV.
271 (2001) (reviewing the generally poor outcomes for former foster children and emphasizing
"the importance of continued family and community support to foster individual development,
even after young people leave home"); Alfreda P. Iglehart & Rosina M. Becerra, Hispanic and
African American Youth: Life After Foster Care Emancipation, 11 J. ETHNIC & CULTURAL
DIVERSITY SOc. WORK 79 (2002) (describing the struggles of twenty-eight Hispanic and
African-American youth after their emancipation from foster care); Matthew Mason et al., A
Comparison of Foster Care Outcomes Across Four Child Welfare Agencies, 7 J. FAM. SOC.
WORK 55 (2003) (presenting interviews with 222 foster care alumni from four different foster
care agencies); Ruth Massinga & Peter J. Pecora, Providing Better Opportunities for Older
Children in the Child Welfare System, 14 FUTURE CHILDREN 15 (2004) (analyzing poor
outcomes for older foster children and suggesting changes in independent living programs).
73 Mark E. Courtney, Irving Piliavin, Andrew Grogan-Kaylor & Ande Nesmith, Foster
Youth Transitions to Adulthood: A Longitudinal View of Youth Leaving Care, 80 CHILD
WELFARE 685, 709 (2001) (tracking 141 young adults who left the Wisconsin foster care system
during 1995-1996).
74 Id. at 712.
75 Id. at 705, tbl. 6.
76 Id. at 706, 711.
'n Id. at 710.
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foster youth in that state will be homeless at least once in the first
three years after they age out of the child welfare system.78
Given the amount of support-both emotional and financial-that
many families continue to provide well after a child reaches the age
of eighteen, the poor results for children who age out is perhaps not
surprising. For example, many families assist with the costs of post-
secondary education and provide housing until the young adult can
afford to live independently; many college graduates return to their
parents' home to save money.79 Wealthy families provide an average
of $33,000 in cash-a figure which does not include education or
room and board-to their adult children between the ages of eighteen
and thirty-four, according to one researcher. 80 Lower-income families,
of course, cannot provide as much financial support, but they still
provide some support (an average of $9,000, according to the same
research).8' According to a National Association of Realtors survey,
twenty-four percent of first-time homebuyers, regardless of their age,
receive help with their down payments from a relative or friend.82
Children who age out of foster care without either an adoptive
family or ties to their biological family have none of this support. If a
child is unlikely to be adopted, it might be preferable not to seek
termination at the fifteen-of-twenty-two mark, trying to retain at least
some potential resource for the child to fall back on after his or her
eighteenth birthday. Indeed, many former foster youths report relying
on their biological families after discharge from foster care.8 3
Certainly, there are cases in which termination is the only
appropriate option, even if it would leave the child as a legal orphan
indefinitely or perhaps permanently. However, in many other cases, it
is possible that severing biological family relationships will hurt an
older child by making him or her a legal orphan and removing the
possibility of family support after the age of eighteen. Having ties to a
biological family-even a dysfunctional one--could be preferable to
being completely on one's own. 84 Termination of parental rights is
78 Desiree Cooper, Home for Girls Doesn't Want Help to End at 18, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, July 6, 2006, at Al.
79 See, e.g., Chris Seper, Many Parents Helping Long After College, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, Sept. 25, 2006, at Al.
8 Id.
81 Id.
82 Ann Perry, Using the Family Silver, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2006, at KI. See also Christine
Haughney, Buying With Help From Mom and Dad, N.Y. TIMES, March 18, 2007, § 11, at 1
(more first-time real estate buyers are receiving help from their parents, and some parents are
purchasing real estate for their children).
83 COURTNEY ET AL., supra note 73, at 698.
84 Additionally, some older children manage to reunite with their biological families by
running away, even if they no longer have any legal ties to their biological relatives. Barth et al.,
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not a one-size-fits-all option, especially for older children. Courts
should carefully weigh both the potential benefits (the possibility of
adoption and a permanent home) with the potential costs (the
possibility of becoming a legal orphan). Each child's situation is
different and requires individualized consideration.
E. Roles of the Players in "the System"
Another concerning consequence of the Ohio Supreme Court's
decision in A.B. is that it effectively emasculates the roles of the judge
and the GAL in child protection hearings in Ohio. GALs, in
particular, play a critical role in the child protection system. A 1974
federal statute, the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
(CAPTA),85 requires states to provide GALs to advocate for the best
interests of each child involved in child protection proceedings.
Shortly thereafter, as states were beginning to implement CAPTA, a
Seattle judge began recruiting volunteers to represent children's best
interests in court; the idea of using non-attorneys to represent children
spread and eventually became a nationwide Court-Appointed Special
Advocate (CASA) program.86 Today, some jurisdictions rely on
CASA volunteers, others on volunteer attorneys, others on paid
GALs, and still others on a combination of some or all of these to
represent children's best interests. Ohio counties employ a variety of
procedures for the appointment of GALs.87 Thirty-five of Ohio's
eighty-eight counties have CASA programs,88 while others require
that GALs be attorneys. 89
Whether the GAL is an attorney or a lay volunteer, a GAL in Ohio
is charged with "perform[ing] whatever functions are necessary to
protect the best interest of the child . ... 90 An Ohio attorney
appointed as a GAL typically is appointed in a dual role-as counsel
for the child and as the GAL.91 If there is any conflict between the
attorney's role as counsel (advocating the child's wishes) and as GAL
supra note 3, at 394.
85 Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974).
86 National CASA Association, History of the CASA Movement,
http://www.nationalcasa.org/about-us/history.html (last visited March 21, 2007).
87 Karen Elliot, The Guardian Ad Litem in Ohio's Domestic Relations Courts: The Square
Peg Fits, 27 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 267, 270 (2001).
88 Ohio CASA Association, Court Appointed Special Advocate-History,
http://www.ohiocasa.orgLM/History.htm (last visited July 18, 2007).
89 See, e.g., CUYAHOGA COUNTY CT. C. P. Juv. Div. R. 17(B).
90 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.281(I) (West 2006). For criticism of Ohio's general lack
of guidelines on the role of GALs, see Charles T. Cromley, Jr., Comment, "[A]s Guardian Ad
Litem I'm in a Rather Difficult Position, " 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 567 (1998).
91 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.281(H); OHIO Juv. R. 4(C)(1).
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(advocating the child's best interests), the attorney must notify the
court; the court then will relieve the attorney from the GAL role and
appoint another GAL.92 If the GAL is a volunteer, and there is a
conflict between the child's wishes and the GAL's determination of
the child's best interests, the court is to appoint an attorney as counsel
for the child.93 Although they do not define the precise scope of a
GAL's role, the Ohio statutes thus seem to value the GAL as an
independent, un-conflicted advocate of the child's best interests and
provide procedures to avoid any conflict.
If the county child welfare agency always acted in a child's best
interests, GALs presumably would not be necessary. The GAL serves
as a form of check on the county agency, independently advocating
the child's best interests to the court. Indeed, the agency's
institutional interests in a given case may be opposed to the child's
best interests. As the amicus curiae brief in A.B. noted, state agencies
receive payments from the federal government for each adoption, but
must bear the costs of a PPLA.9 4 There was no suggestion in A.B. that
potential financial incentives tainted the agency's handling of this
particular case, but the very existence of the financial incentives
means that the agency's interests are not always identical to the
child's.
In almost all other areas of the law, judges have tremendous
discretion, but statutes and principles of due process naturally restrict
this discretion somewhat in the area of child welfare. For instance,
statutory prerequisites must be satisfied and certain procedures must
be followed before judges can terminate parents' rights. This makes
sense, based on the tremendous importance of the interests at stake.95
However, it makes little sense to restrict judges' discretion to
determine a child's best interests, while simultaneously granting the
agency nearly unfettered discretion in the same determination.
Some argue that the "best interests of the child" is a fuzzy standard
subject to cultural, racial, and economic biases,96 but it is difficult to
imagine a child welfare system that did not attempt to determine the
child's best interests. Further, surely it is better to have two persons
responsible for determining the child's best interests, rather than one
alone. If the agency alone is allowed to determine the child's best
92 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.281(H); OHIO Juv. R. 4(C)(2).
93 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.281(H).
94 Brief of Amicus Curiae Justice for Children Project in Support of Appellee Charles
Brown and Appellees A.B., J.B., T.B., and C.B., No. 2005-1966, 2006 WL 926939, at *8 (Mar.
13, 2006), In re A.B., 852 N.E.2d 1187 (Ohio 2006).
95 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
96 See generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD
WELFARE (2002).
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interests without any judicial review, it seems that the risk of biased
determinations would be far greater.
The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in A.B. emasculates the roles
of the GAL and judge in child protection hearings in Ohio. The
decision assumes that the agency is the sole (or best) arbiter of the
child's best interests by giving broad authority to the state child
welfare agency. If the GAL independently believes that a PPLA
placement is in the child's best interests and advocates that
disposition to the juvenile court, the judge is prohibited from agreeing
with the GAL unless the agency also agrees. Only when the agency
has first determined a PPLA placement to be in the child's best
interests may a judge determine that the placement is in fact in the
child's best interests. This is, to put it mildly, an illogical result. Such
a result ties the hands of judges and GALs who disagree with the
agency's determination of the child's best interests, and it may even
prevent the child's true best interests from being achieved.
III. PPLA PLACEMENTS IN OHIO AND ELSEWHERE
A. Ohio
Until the Ohio Supreme Court decided A.B., the appellate districts
were split on the issue of when a juvenile court had authority to place
a child in a PPLA, and this split had lasted for years. More than one
appellate district had determined that the pre-ASFA version of section
2151.353, which referred to "long-term family foster care" instead of
PPLAs, gave the juvenile court "the inherent right to provide for less
restrictive relief than is prayed for in a juvenile complaint," and, thus,
the right to order a long-term foster care placement when the county
agency's initial complaint sought termination of parental rights.97
Other districts disagreed. 98 Several appellate courts held that the pre-
ASFA statutes permitted a court to order another disposition,
97 In re Duncan/Walker Children, 673 N.E.2d 217, 218 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) ("[T]he trial
court is vested with the inherent right to provide for less restrictive relief than is prayed for in a
juvenile complaint."); In re Stoffer, No. 94-CA-0153, 1995 WL 347906, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.
Feb. 6, 1995); In re Cremeans, Nos. 61367, 61368, 61369, 1992 WL 47278, at *4 (Ohio Ct.
App. March 12, 1992). The substitution of "planned permanent living arrangement" for "long-
term foster care" was the only substantive change that 1998 HB 484 made to the relevant
provisions of the statute after ASFA's enactment.
98 In re McDaniel, No. 92-CA-539, 1993 WL 33308 at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 11, 1993)
("[T]he statute leaves no doubt that a court may not place a child in long-term foster care unless
the complaint contains a prayer requesting [such action]."). See also In re Shackelford, No.
11783, 1990 WL 68954 at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. May 22, 1990).
[Vol. 58:1
2007] AGENCY RESTRICTS CHILD PLACEMENT
including long-term foster care, when denying a motion for
permanent custody that arose after the initial complaint.99
Similarly, although the current version of section 2151.353
provides that a court may issue a PPLA order as an initial disposition
only "if the public children services agency or private child placing
agency requests" it, several appellate districts ruled that a juvenile
court has authority to place children in a PPLA sua sponte as a
modification of the initial disposition, based on other provisions of
the Ohio Revised Code that grant juvenile court judges broad
discretion to determine children's placement. 100 The Eighth District
repeatedly took the opposite view, after repudiating its own 1992
decision that interpreted the pre-ASFA statute to permit sua sponte
PPLA placements upon an initial complaint, and its own 2000
decision holding that a judge had authority to order any disposition,
including a PPLA, after denying a motion for termination of parental
rights.10' After a flurry of cases in 2005 coming down on both sides of
the issue, 0 2 the Ohio Supreme Court took up the question and sided
99 In re Buchanan, Nos. 96-CA-0062, 96-CA-0063, 1997 WL 451472, at *4 (Ohio Ct.
App. July 25, 1997) (Upon a motion for permanent custody that arises after the initial
complaint, "[a] court may consider in its discretion the option of long-term family foster care
even when, as here, the agency does not request it"); In re McDaniel, No. 92 CA 539, 1993 WL
33308, at * 10 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 11, 1993) (under Ohio's statutory scheme, when a juvenile
court is proceeding on a later motion for permanent custody, it "has authority to order any of the
dispositional alternatives it deems appropriate, as long as that alternative is in the best interest of
the child. There is no language in either of these sections which limits the court to the
disposition requested in the original complaint.") (quoting In re Smith, No. CA89-96-037, 1990
WL 70926, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. May 29, 1990) (superseded by statute, JUV. R. 40(E)(4)(a), as
recognized in In re Comer, No. CA89-06-037, 1997 WL 596286 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 23,
1997). See also In re Sullivan, No. 13-91-28, 1992 WL 42813, at * 1-2 (Ohio Ct. App. March 4,
1992) (ruling that the trial judge could grant permanent custody, though it was not originally
sought, because the natural mother had been put on notice that her parental rights could be
terminated).
'°°In re Moody, Nos. 01CA1 1, 01CA14, 2001 WL772229, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. June 28,
2001) (affirming trial judge's decision to place a child in a PPLA); In re Lane, No. 18467, 2001
WL 109154 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2001) (same); In re Campbell, Nos. 77552, 77603, 2000 WL
1514365, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2000) ("Whereupon hearing a motion requesting
permanent custody of a child a court decides to deny the motion, the court may proceed in
accordance with R.C. 2151.415 and make any disposition listed in that statute, including a
PPLA."). See also In re Priser, No. 19861, 2004 WL 541124, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. March 19,
2004). ("The court's option.., to place the child in a planned permanent living arrangement...
is available on only three limited situations.")
101 "[A] planned permanent living arrangement can only be ordered if the county seeks it
first." In re M.W., No. 83390, 2005 WL 678111, at 22 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2005). See
also In re M.E., No. 86274,2006 WL 951448 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2006); In re A.B., No.
83971, 2004 WL 2491677 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2004), In re B.N., No. 83704, 2004 WL
1902115 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2004); In re K.P., No. AD 02901679, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS
1494 (Ohio Ct. App. March 31, 2004); In re I.M., Nos. 82669, 82695 2003 WL 23010024 (Ohio
Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2003). Contra In re Cremeans, Nos. 61367, 61368, 61389, 1992 WL 47278
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 12, 1992); In re Campbell, Nos. 77552, 77603, 2000 WL 1514365 (Ohio
Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2000).
10 2 See In re A.S., 839 N.E.2d 972 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a juvenile court has
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with those who read the statute as forbidding all PPLA placements
unless the agency has first requested them.
As noted in Section I, the majority of the Ohio Supreme Court
found the language of section 2151.353 to be "unambiguous."'
0 3
Despite the majority's confidence that its interpretation is the only
legitimate interpretation of the statute, however, the language is not
necessarily unambiguous. Indeed, several strong arguments can be
made for interpreting the statute differently. The dissenters at the
Ohio Supreme Court, as well as the majority on the court below, read
section 2151.353 as applying only to initial disposition, and section
2151.415 as applying to subsequent dispositions or modifications of
the initial disposition. This view seems plausible from several
different theories of statutory interpretation.
First, the "unambiguous" plain meaning the majority cited may not
be so unambiguous. Nearly all other states use the term "dispositional
hearing" to refer to the initial disposition and/or journalizing of the
case plan, but use another term (most commonly "permanency
hearing") to refer to the later hearing and review at which a child's
permanent plan is determined and/or ordered. 10 4 Ohio's statutes and
the authority to order a PPLA on its own initiative), rev'd 853 N.E.2d 291 (Ohio 2006); In re
A.B., No. 22659, 2004 WL 2291869 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2005) (same); In re M.W., No.
83390, 2005 WL 678111, (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2005) (holding that the county must request a
PPLA); Miller v. Greene County Children's Serv. Bd., 833 N.E.2d 805 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005)
(affirming the trial court's denial of county agency's motion for termination of parental rights
and finding by clear and convincing evidence that the child's profound disabilities and health
problems made a PPLA placement in a specialized foster home in his best interest).103 In re A.B., 852 N.E.2d 1187, 1193 (Ohio 2006).
104 For statutes referring to "permanency hearings," see ALA. CODE § 12-15-62(c) (2005),
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.990(24) (2006), ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-862(A) (2007), COLO. REV.
STAT. § 19-1-103(83.5) (2006), CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-129(k) (2004 & Supp. 2007), Del.
Fam. Ct. R. Civ. Pr. 216 (defining a permanency hearing and setting requirements therefore),
D.C. CODE § 16-2323(a)(4) (2005 & Supp. 2007), FL. STAT. § 39.621 (2003 & Supp. 2007),
GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-58(o) (2005), IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1602(26) (2007), 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 405/1-3(11.2) (1999 & Supp. 2007), IND. CODE § 31-34-21-7 (1999 & Supp.
2007), IOWA CODE § 232.58 (2006), KANSAS STAT. ANN. § 38-1502(y) (2000), KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 610.125 (West 2006), LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. Art. 702(B) (2004), MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 119, § 29B (2003 & Supp. 2007), MINN. STAT. ANN. 260C.201-Subd. 11-1 la (West 2007),
MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-613(3)(A) (Supp. 2006), MO. REV. STAT. § 210.720 (2004), MONT.
CODE ANN. § 41-3-445 (2006), NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1312(3) (2004), N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:4C-61.2 (Supp. 2007), N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-25.1 (WEST 2007), N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §
355.5 (McKinney Supp. 2007), N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02(13) (2006), OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §
7003-5.6d (2007), OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.470 (2005), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6351(e) (2000 &
Supp. 2007), R.I. GEN. LAWS §40-11-12.1 (2007), S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-21.2 (1999),
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-2-409 (2005), TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.301 and following (Vemon
2002 & Supp. 2006), UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-310(3) (2006), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5531
(2001 & Supp. 2006), WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.145(3) (2004 & Supp. 2007), W. VA. CODE §
49-6-5a (Supp. 2007), WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-43 1(d)-(k) (2007). For statutes using slightly
different terms in the same vein, see ARK. CODE ANN. §9-27-338 (2002 & Supp. 2005)
("permanency planning hearing"), CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.22 (West Supp. 2007)
AGENCY RESTRICTS CHILD PLACEMENT
case law, on the other hand, use the word "disposition" in multiple
contexts-the initial disposition, any subsequent modifications of the
original disposition, and the final disposition.10 5 The leading work on
Ohio juvenile law, for instance, refers in a single paragraph to
"dispositional hearings," "dispositional review hearings," "post-
dispositional hearings," and "post-disposition motions ... requesting
new dispositional orders."'' 0 6 With such repetitive and confusing
language, perhaps it is no wonder the Ohio Supreme Court disagreed
about which dispositions section 2151.353 governed.
From a textualist perspective, it is entirely possible to read section
2151.353(A)(5) as applying only at the initial dispositional hearing.
The first sentence of the statute indicates that "[i]f a child is
adjudicated an abused, neglected, or dependent child, the court may
make any of the following orders of disposition., 10 7 The text of this
sentence suggests that the dispositions listed are available upon the
initial determination of abuse, neglect, or dependency. Indeed, several
Ohio appellate districts had previously interpreted section 2151.353 to
be inapplicable to proceedings after the initial disposition hearing,
holding that section 2151.415 governed "motions for dispositional
orders upon expiration of temporary custody"10 8 and that a "court has
discretion under [section] 2151.415(A) at post-dispositional hearings
to impose any of the dispositional options contained in that section
according to the child's best interest."10 9
("permanency review hearing"), HAW. REV. STAT § 587-73 (Supp. 2005) ("permanent plan
hearing"), ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4038-B (Supp. 2006) ("permanency planning
hearing"), MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-823(b) (West 2006) ("permanency planning
hearing"), MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.19a (West 2002 & Supp. 2007) ("permanency
planning hearing"), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-907 (2005) ("permanency planning hearing"), S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-7-766 (Supp. 2006) ("permanency planning hearing"), VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
282.1 (2003 & Supp. 2007) ("permanency planning hearing"). Additionally, Puerto Rico's
statutes use the terms "final dispositional hearing" and "permanency hearing" apparently
synonymously. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, §§447(k), 447(s) (2006).
105 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2151.353 (West 2005 & Supp. 2006) ("the court may
make any of the following orders of disposition") and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2151.415(B)
(West 2005 & Supp. 2006) ("upon the filing of a motion pursuant to division (A) of this section
[to modify the initial disposition], the court shall hold a dispositional hearing on the date set at
the dispositional hearing held pursuant to section 2151.35 of the Revised Code"). See generally
PAUL C. GIANNELLI & PATRICIA MCCLOUD YEOMANS, OHIO JUVENILE LAW § 17.14 (2006
ed.).
106 GIANNELLI & YEOMANS, supra note 105, at § 17.14.
107 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(A).
108ln re Sullivan, No. 13-91-28, 1992 WL 42813, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. March 4, 1992).
This was also the conclusion of the court below in In re A.B., 2004 WL 2291869, No. 22659
(Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2005).
109 GIANNELLI & YEOMANS, supra note 105, at § 17.14 (citing In re Sullivan, No. 13-91-
28, 1992 WL 42813, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. March 4, 1992), and In re Smith Children, No. CA89-
06-037, 1990 WL 70926, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. May 29, 1990)).
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Reading section 2151.415 lends great weight to this argument.
Section 2151.415 provides, in relevant part:
Except for cases in which a motion for permanent custody
[i.e., termination of parental rights] . . . is required to be
made, a public children services agency or private child
placing agency that has been given temporary custody of a
child pursuant to section 2151.353 of the Revised Code, not
later than thirty days prior to the earlier of the date for the
termination of the custody order . . . or the date set at the
dispositional hearing for the hearing to be held pursuant to
this section, shall file a motion with the court that issued the
order of disposition requesting that any of the following
orders of disposition of the child be issued by the court.'' 0
The text of this statute indicates that it is applicable to motions
filed after the initial disposition of temporary custody (a disposition
granted under section 2151.353) expires. In the A.B. case, this is
precisely what happened; the court had granted temporary custody to
the Summit County Children's Services Board."' It then issued an
order for a PPLA after the temporary custody order expired and the
agency sought permanent custody of the children."12 Regarding PPLA
placements, section 2151.415 provides that an agency must document
the reasons a PPLA is appropriate if it has requested such a
placement," 13 and then states:
If the court issues an order placing a child in a planned
permanent living arrangement, both of the following apply:
(a) The court shall issue a finding of fact setting forth the
reasons for its finding;
(b) The agency may make any appropriate placement for the
child and shall develop a case plan for the child that is
designed to assist the child in finding a permanent home
outside of the home of the parents.' 14
The text of section 2151.415 contains no requirement that the
agency request a PPLA placement before a juvenile court can order
one. The dissent's textual argument about sections 2151.353 and
"
0 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2151.415(A).
'ln re A.B., No. 22659, 2005 WL2291869, at 1-12 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 21,2005).
112 Id.
I OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.415(C)(1).
1 4 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.415(C)(2).
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2151.415 thus appears to be a strong one; if section 2151.415 is
applicable to dispositions arising after the initial disposition of
temporary custody, the court should have discretion to order a PPLA
when appropriate even if the agency has not requested it.
When faced with multiple possible meanings of the statute's text
here, it does not seem unreasonable to consider the consequences of
adopting each meaning. Even Justice Scalia, an ardent textualist, has
ignored clear statutory text in more than one case because the plain
meaning of the text would produce "absurd" results. 1 5 This case
presents a stronger argument for invoking the anti-absurdity canon,
because the text of section 2151.353 is not unambiguous. It seems
that textualists justifiably could examine the text of the statute, find
that the text has two potential meanings, and then consider the results
of reading the statute each way. In the A.B. decision, the
consequences of reading the statute as broadly as the Ohio Supreme
Court did are potentially devastating, possibly preventing children
from achieving appropriate permanent placements.
The dissenters' reading of the statute's text looks to the whole act,
not a single statute in isolation. The dissent wryly commented that
"the result reached by the majority is reasonable-if you read only
[section] 2151.353(A)(5), and out of context at that. You must ignore
the fact that [section] 2151.353(A)(5) applies only upon the initial
adjudication .... And you must ignore [sections] 2151.01, 2151.414,
and 2151.415. ' 16 Section 2151.353 is part of a larger statutory
scheme for child protection. All of chapter 2151 relates to juvenile
court, and many child protection statutes are found within the chapter.
Therefore, it plausibly could be argued that the preferable meaning of
the words of section 2151.353 "is the one consistent with the rest of
the statute and statutory scheme,"'" 7 that is, the one that restricts
115John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2419-2420
(2003). Manning argues that Scalia and other modem textualists should not use the absurdity
doctrine to avoid the plain meaning of a text, because doing so undermines the philosophical
bases of textualism itself:
[J]udicial reliance on the absurdity doctrine risks disturbing the outcomes of the legislative
process by 'correcting' wording that Congress itself might have been unable-or at least
unwilling-to correct. Because the absurdity doctrine is triggered by the conclusion that
Congress could not conceivably have intended the results otherwise compelled by a clear
statutory text (taken in context), the foregoing uncertainty about the legislative process
makes the doctrine questionable, at least as it is now understood.
Id. at 2431. Here, however, the statutory text is less than clear, and it seems that examining the
consequences of adopting each possible statutory meaning would not undermine textualism.
116 In re A.B., 852 N.E.2d 1187, 1194 (Ohio 2006) (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
17 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION
AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 272 (2d ed., Thomson/West 2006) (2000).
2007]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
section 2151.353's applicability to the disposition upon the initial
complaint.
Moreover, the dissent's views also find justification in an
intentionalist approach to statutory interpretation. The Ohio General
Assembly itself enacted section 2151.01, which demands:
The sections in Chapter 2151. of the Revised Code, with the
exception of those sections providing for the criminal
prosecution of adults, shall be liberally interpreted and
construed so as to effectuate the following purposes:
(A) To provide for the care, protection, and mental and
physical development of children subject to Chapter 2151. of
the Revised Code, whenever possible, in a family
environment, separating the child from the child's parents
only when necessary for the child's welfare or in the interests
of public safety;
(B) To provide judicial procedures through which Chapters
2151. and 2152. of the Revised Code are executed and
enforced, and in which the parties are assured of a fair
hearing, and their constitutional and other legal rights are
recognized and enforced.
The majority opinion argued that section 2151.353 places
limitations on PPLAs "[b]ecause the General Assembly intended to
encourage speedy placement." ' 1 8 Presumably, the court is referring to
speedy adoptive placements.
However, the General Assembly's own language in section
2151.01 does not mention speedy adoptive placement among the
purposes of the chapter. There may be many reasons why the General
Assembly did not enact specific language about speedy adoptive
placements, of course, and theorizing about its silence on this matter
could lead to different conclusions: the legislators assumed that their
purpose to encourage speedy adoptive placement was clear, they
simply did not think about including it, or they deliberately omitted it.
The Ohio Supreme Court took the first view, finding that the
legislators' intent was clear from the text of the statute at issue. Given
the ambiguities noted above, though, it is difficult to infer intent from
the text. The dissent took the third view, arguing that if the legislature
wished to make a clear statement of its purpose to encourage speedy
adoptive placement, it surely could have done so. The dissent argued
Isln re A.B., 852 N.E.2d at 1193.
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that the reason for the restrictions in section 2151.353 is that, on an
initial complaint, the agency knows the situation best; once the judge
has presided over several hearings, he or she is in the best position to
determine whether a PPLA is in the child's best interests.1 9 The
dissent read other provisions of the Revised Code (like section
2151.415) as evidence of a legislative intent that after the initial
complaint, the juvenile court should have discretion to order any
placement that is in a child's best interests.12°
Intriguingly, at least one lower court in Ohio appears not to be
persuaded by the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in A.B. In an
opinion just four months after the Ohio Supreme Court's decision,
one Ohio appellate district ruled: "We disagree with the state's
assertion that the trial court could not have considered a PPLA in the
absence of a request from [the agency] for such a placement. We have
previously held that the court may consider, sua sponte, the option of
a PPLA even when the agency did not request it.' ' 21 This is, of
course, in direct opposition to A.B., but the appellate court never once
mentioned the A.B. decision.1
22
B. Other States'Approaches
The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in A.B., as discussed above,
hinged on one phrase: "if a public children services agency or private
child placing agency requests the court to place the child in a planned
permanent living arrangement."' 23 Many states have similar phrases
in their statutes, modeled on a federal provision. 24 Although the
statutes may appear similar to Ohio's, other states have taken varying
viewpoints on whether a judge may place a child in an alternative
planned permanent living arrangement without a prior agency request.
Only New Hampshire appears to have reached the same conclusion as
the Ohio Supreme Court-that the state child welfare agency must
request an alternative planned permanent living arrangement and
119 1d. at 1194-95 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
1201d
121 In re J.R., No. 21749, 2007 WL 127729, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2007).
122 The appellate court eventually concluded, however, that "the trial court acted within its
discretion in choosing not to consider a PPLA under the circumstances presented in this case."
Id.
123 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(A)(5) (1998).
124 For more on the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act, see supra Section i.A. The
relevant phrase in the federal legislation is: "or (in cases where the State agency has documented
to the State court a compelling reason for determining that it would not be in the best interests of
the child to return home, be referred for termination of parental rights, or be placed for adoption,
with a fit and willing relative, or with a legal guardian) placed in another planned permanent
living arrangement." 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (1998).
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document to the court a "compelling reason" justifying the
placement.1
25
In Maine, the statute relating to permanency plans provides that a
child may be "placed in another planned permanent living
arrangement when the department has documented to the court a
compelling reason for determining that it would not be in the best
interests of the child to be returned home, be referred for termination
of parental rights or be placed for adoption, be placed with a fit and
willing relative, or be placed with a legal guardian.' ' 126 The Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine, after discussing the Maine legislature's
statements prioritizing permanency for children, held that a trial court
"must consider the statutorily mandated concept of permanency when
making best interest determinations . . . [and] must specifically
determine whether a compelling reason exists that supports a
disposition that will result in long-term foster care.' 27 It then
remanded the case to the trial court because the trial court's best
interest determination had not specifically articulated a compelling
reason for the order for a long-term foster care placement. Notably,
the Maine court appears simply to have assumed that the trial court
had authority to make such a placement without agency support,
although to some the phrase "when the department has documented"
might suggest to the contrary. 1
28
Similarly, Vermont's statutes provide that a court may place a
child in "another planned permanent living arrangement [when] the
commissioner [of the department of social and rehabilitation services]
has demonstrated to the satisfaction of the court a compelling reason
that it is not in the child's best interests to return home, to have
residual parental rights terminated and be released for adoption or
placed with a fit and willing relative or legal guardian."'
129
The Supreme Court of Vermont upheld a trial court's denial of a
petition for termination of parental rights and subsequent order for a
long-term foster care placement, holding that the trial court had
documented a "compelling reason" to justify the placement. 30 Like
the Maine high court, the Vermont Supreme Court did not discuss the
portion of the statute that might suggest agency approval is necessary,
125In re Juvenile 2005-426, 910 A.2d 1240, 1242 (N.H. 2006).
1
2
6 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4038(7-A)(B)(1)(d) (2004).
127In re Thomas H., 889 A.2d 297, 307 (Me. 2005).
128 Id. passim.
129 VT. ST. ANN. tit. 33, § 553 1(d)(4) (2001).
130 In re A.G., 868 A.2d 692, 700 (Vt. 2004).
[Vol. 58:1
AGENCY RESTRICTS CHILD PLACEMENT
and assumed that the trial court had authority to make such a
placement. 131
In Tennessee, an appellate court vacated a trial court's order for a
long-term foster care placement, based on the trial court's lack of
findings as to the children's best interests. 132 The Tennessee statute on
permanency plans states: "Placement in another planned permanent
living arrangement shall only be appropriate in cases where the state
agency has documented a compelling reason for determining that the
other goals would not be in the best interests of the child because of
the child's special needs or circumstances."' 133 The appellate court
discussed the reasons for disfavoring long-term foster care, and
remanded the case for the required findings. 34 However, it never
indicated that the trial court lacked authority to order long-term foster
care when, as in that case, the agency supported termination of
parental rights instead of long-term foster care. 
135
In Iowa, the status of alternative permanent placements seems
unclear. In 2005, an appellate court held that a trial court erred in
ordering long-term foster care for two children instead of placing
them with a maternal aunt. It found that "the juvenile court is to order
another planned permanent living arrangement only [if the agency]
has documented to the court's satisfaction a compelling reason" that
other permanency options, such as placement with the aunt, are
inappropriate. 136 The court wrote:
We note that DHS not only did not attempt to document that
guardianship and custody with [the aunt] would not be in the
children's best interest, but in fact forcefully argued that it
would be in their best interest. We need not and do not decide
that the juvenile court cannot order another planned
permanent living arrangement in the absence of such
documentation. We do conclude, however, that under the
facts and circumstances of this case and the [statutory]
language . . . the DHS' position is entitled to substantial
weight. 137
131 Id
1
32 
In re M.E.W., No. M2003-01739-COA-R3-PT, 2004 WL 865840 (Tenn. Ct. App. April
21,2004).
33 TENN. CODE. ANN. § 37-2-409(b)(2) (2005).
l34M.E.W., No. M2003-01739-COA-R3-PT, 2004 WL 865840 at *15-19.
135 Id.
1361n re E.K., No 05-0919, 2005 WL 2508542 at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2005)
(internal quotations omitted).
137Id.
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Just a few months later, another panel of the same court affirmed a
trial court decision that denied the state's petition to terminate
parental rights and placed two girls in long-term foster care.' 38 The
state in that case opposed the long-term foster care placement and
strongly argued against it, but the appellate court upheld the order
despite its earlier suggestion that a long-term foster care order without
agency support might be invalid.
39
IV. CHARTING A COURSE FOR THE FUTURE
The result of A.B. is wrong and carries potentially harmful
consequences for those children for whom a PPLA is the only
appropriate permanency option. How, then, should Ohio, and the
nation as a whole, deal with these children? Several potential
solutions exist that would better serve children's interests.
First, the Ohio Supreme Court could overturn its own decision and
reinterpret section 2151.353 to be applicable only to initial
dispositions. Then, a juvenile court judge could not place children in a
PPLA upon an initial complaint unless the agency had specifically
requested a PPLA, but the judge could place the children in a PPLA
later, after an expired grant of temporary custody to the agency. This
interpretation would be justifiable both from a textualist and
intentionalist approach to statutory interpretation, and it would create
far fewer complications for children. Courts in other states have
interpreted facially similar language in this way as they struggled to
deal with the problems surrounding long-term foster care.
If the court does not reconsider its decision, the Ohio General
Assembly should amend the Ohio Revised Code to clarify the
circumstances in which each dispositional statute applies. It would be
helpful if the General Assembly used different terms to refer to
different hearings, such as "dispositional hearing" and "permanency
hearing." Currently, the multiple meanings of the word "disposition"
in the statutes are confusing even to the Ohio Supreme Court.
However the General Assembly chooses to revise the statutes, it
should make individualized consideration of a child's best interests
the primary concern. "[A] general public policy favoring adoption,
which must be preceded by termination of parental rights, over long
term foster care cannot substitute for an individualized determination
of the best interest of the child who is the subject of the termination
proceeding."'
140
38 In re R.B., No. 06-0594, 2006 WL 1409231 (Iowa Ct. App. May 24, 2006).
1391d. at *2.
4IOn re M.E.W., No. M2003-01739-COA-R3-PT, 2004 WL 865840 at *12 (Tenn. Ct.
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The General Assembly also should consider establishing a
subsidized guardianship program in Ohio. A guardianship with the
current foster mother might have been appropriate for the B.
children-it would have enabled them to continue living with her,
they would have remained together, and they would have some
measure of legal permanence. The fact that this option was never
mentioned in this case suggests that the foster mother may have
needed financial aid that was unavailable to her if she became a
guardian. Establishing a subsidized guardianship program would
create another option for children for whom the permanency goals of
reunification and adoption are inappropriate.
Finally, the General Assembly ought to encourage agencies to
offer stronger reunification services to biological families and to seek
potential adoptive placements via concurrent planning (including
legal risk placements in appropriate cases) early, as soon as it appears
that a child will not be able to return to his or her birth family. A legal
risk placement is a "placement of a child with a family who is
interested in adopting the child [before] the child placed is legally
free" for adoption, that is, before his or her parents' rights have been
terminated.' 4 1 This approach, which is the one that Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania, apparently has chosen, would begin to address the
plight of Ohio's 6,664 legal orphans and could benefit older children
by seeking potential adoptive families for them at earlier ages. This
would reduce the risk of children being placed into PPLA placements
solely because the passage of time has made other placements
inappropriate.
Various stakeholders in the Ohio child welfare system currently
are working to revamp Ohio's child welfare statutes. 142 The draft bill
changes Ohio's system to a non-fault-based, "Child in Need of
Protective Services" system. 143 The proposed language removes much
of the ambiguity that currently exists in the Ohio Revised Code
statutes relating to abused, neglected or dependent children. However,
the draft bill does not currently change any of the dispositional
statutes (with the exception of changing the definitions therein) or the
circumstances under which certain dispositions are available.
App. April 21, 2004).
141 OHIO DEP'T OF JOB & FAMILY SERV., OHIO ADOPTION GUIDE 26,
http://www.odjfs.state.oh.us/forms/file.asp?id=44766 (last visited March 21, 2007).
142 See Ohio Children Protection Law Reform Initiative (OCPLRI),
http://www.ohiochildlaw.com (last visited July 18, 2007).
143 Ohio Children Protection Law Reform Initiative, Child in Need of Protective Services,
http://www.law.capital.edu/adoption/ocplri/Draft-Statute-at 4 10-final.pdf (last visited July
18, 2007).
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CONCLUSION
Adoption gives children a chance to thrive and grow in a "forever
family," and it is a good and worthy goal for many of the children in
America's foster care system. A myopic focus on adoption, however,
can obscure other permanency options that may be more appropriate
for certain children. 144 Although adoption is good, it is not the best
option for all children. Terminating parental rights for those children,
in the hopes that the permanency goal of adoption could one day be
appropriate or achievable, has the potential to do more harm than
good.
In the A.B. case, a PPLA placement would enable the siblings to
continue living together, with a foster mother who all agreed was
wonderful. Terminating their father's rights could have led to them
being separated through adoption-and all agreed that separating the
siblings was not in their best interests. Yet this is precisely the result
that may follow, based on the Ohio Supreme Court's prohibiting
juvenile courts from considering a placement that may be in the
child's best interests. The PPLA might not have been an ideal
placement, because of its legal impermanence, but it seemed to be the
only one that fit the B. siblings at that point in time.
Long-term foster care is a bad option for most children, with bad
outcomes. The Ohio legislature had these outcomes in mind when it
restricted juvenile courts' ability to place children in a PPLA in the
initial disposition of the agency's complaint. For some children,
however, a PPLA may be the only appropriate option. The restrictions
the Ohio Supreme Court placed on juvenile courts' ability to order
PPLAs at subsequent dispositions fetter a court's ability to order the
most appropriate permanent placement for each child.
EMILY W. MCGILLt
14 See Sacha Coupet, Swimming Upstream Against the Great Adoption Tide: Making the
Case for 'Impermanence,' 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 405 (2005) (arguing that agencies and even GALs
pressure kinship caregivers to adopt even when adoption is a culturally and family-inappropriate
option).
t J.D. Candidate 2008, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
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